FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION, art. 42(1), 42(5) (Malay.) http://www.agc.gov.my/agcportal/uploads/files/Publications/FC/Federal%20Consti%20( BI%20text).pdf. In this article, I use the term 'pardon' to refer to a prisoner's outright release from prison, whereas 'clemency', 'commutation' or 'remission' refer either to the replacement of one type of sentence (e.g. death) with another (e.g. life imprisonment), or else the reduction in the length of a prison sentence without immediately releasing the prisoner. Malaysia's Pardons Boards are able to recommend all three forms of leniency to prisoners (Criminal Procedure Code, ch. XXVII sec. 281(c) (Malay.); Criminal Procedure Code, ch. XXVIII, sec. 300-301 (Malay.) http://www.agc.gov.my/agcportal/uploads/files/Publications/LOM/EN/Act%20593%20-%20Criminal%20Procedure%20Code.pdf.), and throughout the article I use the term 'Royal Pardon' when referring to these powers as a whole.
his petition for pardon, Anwar filed a judicial review application in the Malaysian High Court to challenge the advice of the Pardons Board, for which leave to appeal was denied on July 15, 2016. 3 In this article, I describe the way in which the Malaysian Pardons Boards operate and propose a set of plausible hypotheses explaining why the rejection of Anwar's application for pardon, submitted on his behalf by his wife (Wan Azizah Wan Ismail) and two of his daughters (Nurul Izzah Anwar and Nurul Nuha Anwar), came as no surprise. Despite arguments in the Malaysian media made in favor of the purported independence of the Pardons Board as a decision-making body and the pre-eminence of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong as the final decision maker on pardon, 4 this article argues that through its composition and procedures, the Federal Pardons Board that disposed of Anwar's petition may be subject to significant political influence from the Barisan Nasional government in power in Malaysia. 5 Moreover, the innocence-based criteria presumably presented on behalf of Anwar in written submissions to the Federal Pardons Board would not have accorded with any of the criteria needed to justify a Royal Pardon. As such, Anwar's case provides a salient demonstration of the way in which Malaysia's Pardons Boards operate in practice. Analysis of this practice will be of interest to local legal practitioners and legal scholars researching the constitutional law, politics, and criminal justice system of Malaysia.
A. Background on the Proceedings against Anwar Ibrahim
Anwar served as Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia from 1993 to 1998 and as Finance Minister from 1991 to 1998. Anwar was a Member of Parliament for the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) party 3 Ida Lim, Lawyers say apex court unlikely to revisit Anwar's Sodomy II case, MALAY MAIL ONLINE, Oct. 12, 2016, http://www.themalaymailonline.com/print/malaysia/lawyers-say-apex-court-unlikely-torevisit-anwars-sodomy-ii-case. 4 Veerasamy Anbalagan, Sirul's mum to apply to Sultan of Selangor for pardon, THE MALAYSIAN INSIDER, Apr. 13, 2015, http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/malaysia/article/siruls-mum-to-apply-to-selangorsultan-for-pardon-says-pas-mp; Salleh Buang, Ire over Anwar's clemency petition, NEW STRAITS TIMES, Mar. 5, 2015; Eileen Ng, Agong has final say on royal pardon application, says minister, THE MALAYSIAN INSIDER, June 10, 2015, http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/malaysia/article/agong-has-final-say-on-royalpardon-application-says-de-facto-law-minister; Will King Go Against UMNO? Agong has last word in Anwar's pardon -lawyers, MALAYSIA CHRONICLE, Feb. 26, 2015. and had been groomed to be the eventual successor to Prime Minister Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad. However, in 1998, following a political split with Mahathir, Anwar was removed from his posts, charged, and convicted for the abuse of his ministerial office, and for sodomizing his family's driver. 6 Internationally, the charges and convictions were widely denounced as the result of political interference with the criminal justice system. This international outcry opined that Anwar's convictions were an attempt to end his political career. 7 Anwar was sentenced to prison for 15 years and served six years for the corruption charge. He was freed in 2004 when the Malaysian Federal Court overturned his sodomy conviction. In 1999, after the initial allegations surfaced, Anwar's wife, Dr. Wan Azizah Wan Ismail, founded the political party Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR). 8 Anwar led PKR after his ban from politics expired and served as Malaysia's official opposition party leader from 2008 to 2015. Currently, PKR is still regarded as the leading opposition party in Malaysia.
In 2008, Anwar was arrested a second time and charged with sodomizing a male aide. Similar to his conviction in 1998, the charge was internationally criticized as being politically motivated. 9 However, Anwar A free Anwar would certainly be a grave threat to the electoral prospects of the ruling Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition… Before the verdict [of acquittal], it had been widely thought to be a foregone conclusion that Anwar would be found guilty as charged and put away before the coming general election -reflecting the generally low confidence the Malaysian public had in the judiciary. 10 However, the Court of Appeal overturned Anwar's acquittal in March 2014, which imposed on him a five-year prison sentence. Anwar's final avenue of judicial appeal to his conviction was brought to Malaysia's highest court, the Federal Court, which ultimately confirmed the Court of Appeal's decision in February 2015.
11 Following his conviction in March 2014, Anwar is banned from politics in Malaysia for a 10 year period: the ban begins with his term of five years of imprisonment and runs for five years after his release. 12 In the meantime, Anwar's wife, Wan Azizah Wan Ismail, won a by-election for Anwar's former parliamentary seat in May 2015.
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Following the rejection of Anwar's appeal to the Federal Court in February 2015, his major procedural hope was an appeal to the Yang diPertuan Agong for Royal Pardon. Anwar's family sent a petition for pardon to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong in February 2015. The petition was rejected soon afterwards in March 2015, and the legal procedures and theory surrounding this decision form the subject of this article.
In the following two sections I will outline the existing academic literature and procedures relating to Royal Pardons in Malaysian criminal cases. After this outline, I will posit the plausible factors which elucidate why Anwar's petition was rejected, and I will describe the implications of these factors for ongoing and future cases in Malaysia. Nevertheless, these sources contain notable omissions from an empirical perspective. As aforementioned, both the decision-making process and Royal Pardon outcomes largely remain a mystery to scholars and to the public. To expand on this literature, academics could conduct further quantitative and qualitative empirical research on the population of prisoners who have benefited from Royal Pardons in Malaysia's recent history, and more importantly socio-legal analysis based on "elite" interviews to determine the way in which Pardons Boards decisions are made. 21 Such interviews are imperative to this article, given that it is not possible to observe Pardons Board proceedings first-hand nor to see records of proceedings in Anwar's case or others. 22 The remainder of this article addresses these deficiencies in the academic literature on the pardons process in Malaysia, using Anwar Ibrahim's case as a point of entry into the topic.
B. Previous Academic Literature on the State and Federal Pardons Boards
sentenced to death" AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 18 at 90.
"In Malaysia, the Sultan of Johor, Sultan Ibrahim has consented to grant full pardon to eight prisoners who will be released on July 21 [2012]… On the advice of the board and Attorney-General, and taking into consideration all aspects such as the prisoners' offences, jail term served and rehabilitation achieve, the Sultan consented to consider their release or to reduce their sentences." HANDS OFF CAIN, http://www.handsoffcain.info/bancadati/schedastato.php?idstato=16000466&idcontinente =23).
"More than 1000 prisoners -most of them due to be released before the end of this year -are to be granted amnesty in conjunction with the Malaysia Day celebrations on Tuesday [31 August 1982] . It is understood that state pardon boards have recommended more than 1000 prisoners for freedom… Among the criteria for amnesty consideration are the severity of the crime, the prisoner's behaviour during detention, his record and the danger he might pose to the public should he be released before serving his full sentence." Malaysia Day pardon for 1,000 prisoners, THE STRAITS TIMES, Aug. 27, 1982. 21 Interviews with criminal justice decision-makers and experts in the field are of critical importance in a study such as the present one, as they have the potential to provide:
insights into events about which we know little: the activities that take place out of the public or media gaze, behind closed doors... interviews can provide immense amounts of information that could not be gleaned from official published documents or contemporary media accounts. 
C. Royal Pardon Procedures in Malaysian Criminal Cases
In Malaysia, the power grant Royal Pardon may be used either to reduce a death sentence to a punishment less than death, to reduce the term of a prison sentence, or to release the petitioner altogether from prison.
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The reduction or abrogation of a sentence can be initiated in two ways. First 33 This concurrence is largely because the Rulers, Governors and the Agong participate in and preside over the meetings themselves as Chairmen. 34 Later in this article, I will return to the independence of their decision-making.
Finally, in each case the Board typically considers the following documents:
 the petition submitted by the prisoner or on his/her behalf, outlining the reasons that a pardon should be granted Death penalty cases require the following additional information to be submitted to the board:
 the evidence notes from the prisoner's trial and a recommendation from the trial judge as to whether or not the sentence of death should be carried out; and optionally,  a report from the Federal Court on any appeal in that court. with a conventional reading of the Malaysian Constitution, whereby the Agong dispenses pardon as a benevolent sovereign, rather than possessing a power analogous to judicial review. 41 Examples of these non-legal factors influential in previous cases include a prisoner's previous public service, political connections, and in the case of foreign prisoners, good international relations with his/her country of origin. 4243 However, a focus on non-legal matters by academic and media commentators may simply reflect the greater media exposure of 'public interest' cases, 44 rather than more mundane petitions decided on the basis of retributive factors where punishment is remitted as it is undeserved, 45 Examples are clemency granted on the basis of wrongful conviction, one or more dissenting judgements contained in the original conviction casting a degree of doubt over the accused's guilt, a sentence being disproportionate in relation to similar cases or codefendants, the fact the crime was committed 'out of necessity, coercion or adherence to moral principles' (RANDALL COYNE AND LYN ENTZEROTH, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 843 (2nd ed. 2001)), the prisoner's circumstances falling just short of an established defense in law, the age and gender of the prisoner, and compassionate grounds due to terminal illness of the prisoner or a family member. also consider the quality of the evidence adduced at the trial and the safeness of the conviction'. However, as I outline below, despite assertions that the safeness of the conviction may be one of the factors considered, there has not yet been a Pardons Board decision benefiting a prisoner who was thought to be factually innocent of the crime committed, as opposed to legally innocent, where the prosecutor has not been able to prove factual guilt due to insufficient evidence or procedural improprieties. irregular and Board members do not include correctional services personnel. Many prisoners in lower-profile, unreported cases have been awarded pardon or commutation where the prisoner "showed remorse, had repented and apologized, and promised good behavior and not to repeat the offence."
52 Additional factors favoring commutation or pardon include that a minor offense was committed, the prisoner having a clean record before the offense in question, and no assessed risk of dangerousness to the public upon the prisoner's release. 53 As noted above, each prisoner serving a longer term of imprisonment is automatically considered for release every four years, in addition to holding the right to petition the Ruler, Governor or Agong every two years. For prisoners facing natural life or life sentences, the longer the period spent in prison, the greater the opportunity to demonstrate the desired criteria for a Royal Pardon, and the more chances the prisoner is given to petition for one.
Bearing in mind a number of methodological caveats, 54 the following examples form a chronological compilation of pardons and sentence commutations reported in the media, by NGOs and in academic articles since the mid-1970s, where sufficient details are known about the prisoner's case and the reasons the pardon was given. These examples do not include examples of prisoners who were released on the basis of good behavior over a long period. I have included commutations in capital cases as well as where the petitioner's prison sentence was reduced or abrogated by the relevant Ruler, Governor or Agong. In some cases, the names and 53 For example, THE STRAITS TIMES, supra note 20. 54 There would be many other unreported pardons not included in the list presented. The methodological drawbacks of the sample provided include: a) the bias towards toward cases involving 'non-legal' factors, as identified above; b) a predominance of English-language sources (although I do also speak serviceable Malay); c) a bias towards more recent cases from the 1990s and 2000s, as information has become more readily available in the internet era; and d) a preference for the international media to focus on prisoners sentenced for political, security-based, or drug offences, rather than more mundane crimes and e) a preference for the international media to focus on westerners pardoned in Malaysia, rather than Malaysian and other Asian prisoners.
I have conducted searches of material from the mid-1970s onwards due to a) date restrictions on internet searches for major newspapers; b) the publication of Malaysia's major English-language daily The New Straits Times since 1974; c) Amnesty International's reports on the death penalty (forming a major source of news on commutations) dating from 1977 and c) a desire to keep a list of clemency and pardon grants reasonably current and relevant to modern-day practice, rather than including pardons throughout Malaysia's British colonial history and its union with Singapore from 1963-1965. years of beneficiaries remain unavailable, but importantly, this represents the first time that a scholar has systematically collected data on Royal Pardon grants and the reasons for them in post- Although the contents of Anwar's petition were not divulged to the media, nor was I personally able to obtain a copy of Anwar's petition, 78 it is likely that Anwar's petition was indeed based on an innocence claim. A quote from Anwar's second daughter Nurul Nuha as she submitted the petition is telling: "The court may have passed a guilty verdict, but our father is innocent. Therefore, we are submitting the petition based on Article 42 of the Federal Constitution." 79 Likewise, for Anwar's eldest daughter Nurul Izzah, the hope was that through the pardon, the Agong would "right the wrong, especially in the miscarriage of justice that has taken place" and that " Of course, it should be acknowledged that Anwar does exhibit one key mitigating factor looked upon favorably in previous cases: his public service as an UMNO politician from 1982 to 1998. It is unknown whether or not this point was discussed in the relevant Federal Pardons Board meeting; however, previous pardons awarded to politicians have invariably involved current members of the ruling party. 81 As it was, the Agong rejected Anwar's application for Pardon, finding no circumstances to justify his release from prison. This supports the trend of factual innocence (as opposed to procedural improprieties in the original trial, or else the availability of an arguable defense) never appearing to have been a successful argument, at least since the mid-1970s. Tellingly, this was one reason for Anwar's initial reluctance to submit a petition (whereas the application was eventually submitted on his behalf by his wife and two of his daughters): because petitioning the Yang di-Pertuan Agong for pardon himself would "paint an impression of guilt on him." 
III. NATURE OF THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
The second plausible hypothesis that explains the rejection of Anwar's petition is the overt political influence on the Federal Pardons Board, along with the nature of the materials considered by Board members. As noted, the State and Federal Pardons Boards were constitutionally established in order to provide advice to the Rulers, Governors and the Agong on the exercise of their prerogative power to mitigate or abrogate criminal punishments. This "advice" is interpreted in different ways by the different Rulers, leading to a state-by-state variation in clemency and pardon practice. However, before the final decision is made, the composition of and materials considered by each Pardons Board heavily impact the kind of advice passed to the Ruler. Whether the Ruler ultimately chooses to act on that advice or not, the very fact that a negative recommendation is usually made increases the likelihood that the petition will be rejected. Although these factors reduce the chances of any prisoner receiving a pardon in Malaysia, they have even greater salience in cases involving political adversaries of the ruling Barisan coalition.
Despite the official position being that the Pardons Boards deliver politically-impartial advice and that "the Federal Government has no say in the power of pardon," 83 the implicitly or overtly political representatives serving on the Pardons Boards (in the form of the Federal Attorney-General, the local Chief Minister, 84 and perhaps even politically sympathetic lay members) 85 85 The lay-members of the Pardons Boards are appointed for renewable terms of three years by the relevant Ruler, Governor or the Agong. FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, art. 42(5)-(6) (Malay.). The original constitutional intention was to provide a racial balance on the Pardons Boards with members from each of Malaysia's three main racial communities: Malay, Indian and Chinese. However, rather than their race, the political fidelity of the three appointees is more likely to be determinative of their views on pardons petitions (on the Federal Pardons Board, at least), given they are appointed to the recommendations for pardon to the Agong, Ruler, or Governor that suit the UMNO-dominated government's agenda. 86 Echoing Hashim's assertion that Federal government influence on these constitutional advisory bodies "may be brought to bear only indirectly through the good offices of the Attorney-General," 87 Harding has more bluntly stated that the Federal Pardons Board, at least, has been subjected to unconstitutional governmental pressure from time to time. 88 The significance for the present case is that, as mentioned earlier in the article, both national and international opinion posit that Anwar's conviction was a politicallymotivated attempt by the UMNO leadership to end his career. 89 Although we cannot be sure in the absence of first-hand testimony or minutes of proceedings, if Malaysia's Federal Government, under the guise of the UMNO leadership, wanted Anwar's petition to be rejected for political reasons, it would probably have been able to achieve a consensus to make that recommendation to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong. 90 The membership of the Federal Attorney-General in the Pardons Board is critical to this argument.
In terms of the decision-making methodology of the Pardons Board, the Malaysian Constitution provides that before disposing of a petition, the members of the Pardons Board "shall consider any written 89 See supra note 17 at 42. 90 Kumar, supra note 86. opinion which the Attorney-General may have delivered thereon." 91 Presumably, this was originally in reference to the Attorney-General's opinion on the legal (rather than political) reasons for issuing a pardon or rejecting the petition. 92 While the prisoner has no formal procedural right to make written or oral submissions to members of the Pardons Board, 93 the Attorney-General's written representations must be considered, and are presented first at each meeting. 94 Likewise, three separate sources confirmed by interview, that it is the Attorney-General's (or his delegate's) written and verbal opinion is the most influential factor on the Pardons Board's decision. 95 As one of these aforementioned interviewees asserted, unlike the trial and appeal judges (whose opinions are sought in cases of death penalty commutation), prison staff and psychologists, the AttorneyGeneral is the only member of the Pardons Board physically present at the meeting and capable of defending the tendered written report on the case. 96 This will have significant bearing on the way that the three appointed lay members vote on the petition, 97 as typically they are not legally trained. In most state cases the Attorney General does not personally attend in order to defend his report but instead sends the relevant state legal adviser, as permitted by art 42(5) of the Constitution of Malaysia (Talib, supra note 16 at 66; Harding, supra note 92 at 70; Hashim, supra note 17 at 42); however, the Attorney General did attend the hearing disposing of Anwar Ibrahim's petition in person, given it was such a high profile case. Ng, supra note 6. 97 Talib, supra note 16 at 66; See also note 83. 98 Interview with Malaysian Member of Parliament, supra note 98.
State's chief legal adviser, also doubles as Malaysia's chief prosecutor.
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Although the Attorney-General's main function on the various Pardons Boards is to advise Board members on the legal issues surrounding the case, 100 the fact that the Attorney General's Chambers have prosecuted the prisoner whose petition comes before the Board arguably creates a conflict of interest. Malaysian civil society has long recognized this as a problem. As a member of the Malaysian Bar observed in 1983:
If an accused person is apprehended after an offence has been committed the Attorney General has the following discretionary powers: to charge him, if so the type of charge, to issue a certificate to bring the case under the emergency legislation [on security offences], to transfer the case to the High Court, to appear in person at the trial, to appeal to the Federal Court against acquittal and to apply for the remand of the accused until the disposal of the appeal, to give a written opinion to the Pardons Board if the accused is convicted and to sit on the Pardons Board when the pardon is considered… The powers of the Attorney General make nonsense the doctrine of separation of powers. 101 Likewise, although the following comments were made in relation to Anwar's first set of trials following the 1998 allegations, they apply equally to the most recent Federal Pardons Board proceedings:
Given the present Attorney-General was the chief prosecutor at Anwar's trials, it is difficult to perceive how, wearing a new hat, he can now exercise that function [to give legal advice on the petition] impartially in relation to Anwar. 102 Why would the Federal Attorney-General recommend pardon if the state has already put significant resources into the prosecution of the case, other than for circumstances arising after conviction? 103 If after arrest, a case exhibits mitigating factors that justify a lesser punishment or an immediate release, a decision not to bring a prosecution, to bring a prosecution for a lesser offense, or a recommendation in favor of administrative detention, 104 can instead be made by in-house by the Attorney-General's Chambers well before the case comes to trial, rather than at the final stage of pardon deliberations. 105 Second, the Attorney-General's closeness to Malaysia's elected government means the latter's agenda usually succeeds. As the state's legal adviser and public prosecutor, the Federal Attorney-General has often been accused of lacking independence from Malaysia's elected government in the exercise of these functions. 106 The very appointment superintendent, rather than the Attorney-General, whose advice presumably focuses on the circumstances known around the time of trial, conviction and sentencing. . This is to be expected where a lack of judicial discretion available over sentencing means that the judges' hands are tied. However, for charges with discretionary penalties such as sodomy (Penal Code, sec. 377B (Malay.)), there is no foreseeable reason why the trial judge would write in favor of a sentence reduction, as to reduce the sentence is an option initially open to the judge at trial. and dismissal process makes it likely that the nominated person will carry out the elected government's bidding. 107 Moreover, in his own case, Anwar had questioned the impartiality of the then-Federal AttorneyGeneral, Abdul Gani Patail, stating that Patail has a "long-standing animosity towards him [Anwar]", 108 stemming from Patail's role as Chief Prosecutor for Anwar's first set of trials in the late 1990s.
109 If this is true, then once the decision to prosecute Anwar a second time for sodomy was made, the Attorney-General's choice not to recommend pardon was already obvious. The only task remaining would be to convince the lay members of the Pardons Board of his view. These lay members, who have the chance to speak during the meeting, 110 will usually not be legally trained nor often familiar with the precise details of the case at hand. 
IV. ROLE OF THE MALAY MONARCHY ON THE PARDONS BOARDS
The third plausible hypothesis explaining the rejection of Anwar's petition concerns the nature and status of the final decision-maker on pardon in the federal jurisdiction. As described throughout this article, the constitutional function of each Pardons Board is to make a recommendation to the respective Ruler, Governor, or Yang di-Pertuan Agong, who sits as Chair of the Board. Although the Chairmen follow a majority of recommendations made in State cases, 112 they are far from mere figureheads in the Royal Pardon process, and are not legally obliged to follow the advice given.
113
The Chairmen, Rulers, Governors, and the Agong actively participate in the petition discussions themselves, even if they ultimately have the final say over a Royal Pardon decision. 114 This process is at odds with the traditional concept of decision-making in a constitutional monarchy, whereby prerogative powers are only exercised in a ceremonial fashion, subject to the advice provided by government ministers. Talib had observed that even though the drafting of the Malaysian constitutional power to grant merciful pardons was significantly influenced by the royal prerogative practiced in the United Kingdom, the various Malaysian State Hereditary Rulers had been exercising their traditional power to pardon well before British possession of Malaysia in 1825, and as far back as the sixteenth century. 115 The late Raja Azlan Shah, a former Malaysian Chief Justice and a Hereditary Ruler of Perak state, asserted that the Malay Sultans ruled in a manner that suggests they frequently exercised clemency and pardon in the form of "mercy from the sovereign" 114 Talib, supra note 16 at 40. 115 Id. at 21-24. 116 According to this theoretical model, clemency or pardon is considered a merciful 'gift' from the executive to the prisoner, and as such its granting may be more a reflection of the benevolent nature of the ruler and his or her desire for social control and to exercise of the 'power over life and death' rather than any particularly deserving features of the case. death of his subjects, administered justice, and maintained law and order. 117 Similarly, even relatively recent Royal Pardons have been granted in conjunction with Rulers' birthday celebrations and on the first day of Ramadan, 118 although it is unclear whether the festivities were the reason for the grants, or simply affected the timing of grants decided by other criteria. Whether due to the continuation of a historical practice associated with the Sultanates and with Islam, 119 a desire to re-assert traditional royal powers after the enactment of the Constitution (Amendment) Act 1994, 120 or simply by force of personality, a number of modern State Rulers have demonstrated their independent discretion in constitutional matters in recent years. 121 It remains the case that the Chairmen of these State
Pardons Boards are formally independent from the elected government and are empowered to authorize what would be politically unpopular pardon grants. 122 However, a number of interview and archival sources also suggest that the Pardons Board dynamics will differ, depending on whether the Board is chaired by one of the nine State Hereditary Rulers with a long collective history of granting pardons, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, or one of the four government-appointed Yang di-Pertuan Negeri. The Yang diPertuan Negeri, being appointed by the Agong on the recommendation of each State Chief Minister pursuant to each State's Constitution, 123 are thought to demonstrate less independence from Barisan Nasional policy in their decision-making on matters of royal prerogative (at least in the ten States where Barisan Nasional holds power). 124 Moreover, with significance for Anwar's case, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong himself holds a rotating throne created only by the Malaysian Constitution in 1957, rather than a stand-alone hereditary title stretching back hundreds of years. 125 The Agong's decision-making independence on clemency and pardons in federal, military, and security cases is the subject of academic and political debate. 126 For example, when asked in Parliament about Anwar's case, the Minister in the Prime Minister's Department, Nancy Shukri, relayed the conventional view that the final decision lay with the Agong rather than with the Attorney-General or the Pardons Board. 127 On the other hand, Suh
However, constitutional law Professor Shad Saleem Faruqi takes the opposite view, stating that "in light of [the subsequent insertion of] Article 40(1A), the Malaysian position is that at the federal level, the grant of pardon is not a discretionary power and must be exercised on advice" (Shad Saleem Faruqi, Multiple advisers for the King There is no legal time limit within which the Agong, Rulers or Governors must come to a final decision on a clemency petition -this is a matter entirely within their royal prerogative (Talib, supra note 16 at 64-65; Malaysia Chronicle, supra note 4), and hence the very fact that Anwar's petition was disposed of within a few weeks suggests either that the Yang di-Pertuan Agong was keen to pardon Anwar, or else that a recommendation had been made by the political executive to reject Anwar's pardon as soon as possible -a recommendation that the Agong saw fit to follow in line with his constitutional role. One possible reason for the unusual speed with which Anwar's case was dealt with was the political executive's desire to force an immediate bi-election in Anwar's Permatang Pauh constituency in Penang, so as to prevent Anwar from garnering convicted in one of the nine Malaysian states with a Hereditary Ruler, the result of his petition for pardon could conceivably have been different. This is largely because the State Hereditary Rulers enjoy a historical mandate to act independently of the wishes of the government representatives on the Pardons Board. 131 Of course, this would largely depend on the degree of sympathy for Anwar emanating from the relevant Ruler, and moreover the Ruler deciding to enter into uncharted territory by issuing a pardon on the grounds of possible innocence: two far from certain assumptions.
V. CONCLUSION
In this article, I have observed that the Yang di-Pertuan Agong's rejection of Anwar Ibrahim's petition for pardon was not surprising for three reasons. 132 First are the factors that have contributed to Malaysian Pardons Boards' decisions to pardon or commute sentences in previous cases. In previous cases, mitigating rather than exculpatory factors were salient. Cases of proclaimed innocence, like Anwar's, do not appear to have swayed Pardons Boards in the past. Second is the likely political influence on the Federal Pardons Board by the pro-government members. Board members with the most influential voices consist of the Federal Attorney-General, the Minister for Federal Territories, and any politically impressionable lay members of the Board, whose input appears to be marginalized in any event. This political influence lowers all prisoners' odds of receiving a pardon, but is especially detrimental to political adversaries of the Barisan Nasional government such as Anwar. Third, the largely ceremonial role of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong in the Pardon process contrasts greatly with the traditionally more assertive Rulers of the nine Malay States. . 131 In such a scenario, the outcome would also depend on which of the nine Malay States Anwar would have been tried in. In three of these states (Kelantan, Penang and Selangor) various opposition parties hold power, and as such a non-Barisan Nasional Chief Minister would be adjudicating on Anwar's case, and appointing the three laymembers, as part of the State Pardons Board. 132 Without actually being inside the room when the decision was made, I acknowledge that the exact opposite could be true: the Yang di-Pertuan Agong might have refused to follow an established line of precedents where factually innocent petitioners were pardoned; the Attorney-General's view is only one of five on the Pardons Board, and moreover the Agong could have exercised his personal discretion to refuse Anwar's pardon in defiance of a positive recommendation from the Federal Pardons Board. However, this combination of events remains unlikely. The analysis presented this article encompasses the three most plausible explanations for the refusal of Anwar's application, on the basis of the available evidence.
Each of these three factors represents an important hypothesis that could apply more broadly across each of Malaysia's 16 State and Federal Pardons Boards in future cases. However, empirical testing of any one of these three theorems in a meaningful way is unlikely and largely impossible. Unlike the courts, the proceedings of Malaysia's Pardons Boards are not open to the public, hence first-hand observations cannot be made on the decision-making process of each five-member Board. Moreover, absent empirical data on the recommendations made by each Pardons Board, scholars cannot be sure whether the end result in each petition comes as a result of agreement between the Chairman and the Board, or else the Hereditary Rulers, Governors and Yang di-Pertuan Agong taking royal prerogative into their own hands. Finally, the third explanatory hypothesis, based on the justifications for previous Royal Pardon grants, is also difficult to verify empirically, although I have attempted to do so in this article. Even a comprehensive historical compilation of Royal Pardon grants via media sources, government and NGO documents, and academic articles is bound to miss many unreported, unremarkable, and long-forgotten pardon and clemency grants. Moreover, even if access could be secured to an archive containing a record of all such grants and rejections, the true reasons for pardon grants and refusals would in many cases remain the subject of speculation, absent first-hand testimony from the decision-makers involved.
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For future studies on clemency and pardon decision-making, I suggest the clearest way forward is the semi-structured "elite" interview with two types of parties: 1) lawyers filing petitions on behalf of their clients and 2) the lay members of the State and Federal Pardons Boards, together with an acknowledgement that the conclusions presented on Anwar's case and others are merely made on the basis of the best possible evidence available to the researcher. However raw and untested, any new hypotheses allowing for an incrementally better understanding of the opaque world of Malaysian clemency and pardons negotiations represents some measure of academic progress. 
